Showing posts with label Vanguard. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vanguard. Show all posts

17 March 2020

How traditional funding would ruin something good



I've been doing some work looking at how we support people who experience domestic violence or abuse, and how we might improve that support.  

During this work, I've gotten to know a fantastic local place that helps women who've broken free of domestic abuse to stay free.  Don't take my word for how great it is – here's what some of the women I spoke with there said about it:

  • "Of all the services I've dealt with, this is the only one that works."
  • "You are actually helped and understood.  They treat you as a person as a whole."
  • "It's welcoming, and you are listened to.  It's like a family working together."
  • "When you experience domestic abuse and leave the relationship, you don't know what you don't know.  They take you through it one step at a time.  They help with all the applications."
  • "You get peer-to-peer support.  It's compassionate, and survivor led."
  • "It's informal.  There's lots to be said for a cup of tea and a chat."
  • "They pull out every stop for the children.  They helped get my child diagnosed for ADHD."

They don't turn people away because of thresholds.  No one completes an assessment form.  They don't work to targets, KPIs, or other metrics.  They build relationships with people, understand what really matters to them, and support them in achieving what matters.  The support is 'bespoke-by-default', responding to each person as an individual.  They have a network of friends and volunteers on hand with all sorts of skills – a handyperson, locksmith, experts on the law, housing, immigration, benefits, etc.  The support isn't time limited, and some of the women have been coming for years.  Many turn their experiences in to 'gifts' they can support their peers with, or have become volunteers themselves.

They've created a safe, welcoming, compassionate, and supportive atmosphere.  There's a real sense of community among the women – at times I struggled to work out who were volunteers or paid workers, and who weren't.   

And it works!  In five years none of the women they've supported have returned to the abusive relationship. 

How might traditional funding ruin it?


In my naivety, I asked one of the people who runs it "Do you get any funding – from the council or health or anyone else?"  The answer was a resounding "No".  The place is funded unconditionally by a charitable organisation, through local donations, and through the work of its friends and volunteers.  
I started to speculate on how this place might be ruined if they were commissioned or funded in the traditional and prevailing way.

  • Traditional commissioning starts from an assumption that competitive markets work for public services, giving greater choice and efficiency.  To understand why this assumption is so flawed, read this book chapter from Kathy Evans, Chief Executive of Children England.  
  • This means, in practice, the focus is on price.  To compete and compare on price, the service needs to be specified.
  • Specification means a standardised service response.  This is where things really start to go wrong.  People are people shaped – they don't fit in to neat little boxes.  A standardised response cannot cope with the huge variety of people's need.  As Mark Smith writes in his blog, "[Standardisation] takes away an opportunity to apply judgement and nuance, borne from experience and an appraisal of what matters to whomever needs help"
  • Once you standardise you have functional specialisms or silos.  Each service or provider is commissioned to only do specific things, and therefore won't do others.  The people who come to that service are looked at and labelled through the lens of whatever that service is commissioned to do.  Then they're referred or 'sign-posted' to the next service, who repeats the process again. 
  • When providers are commissioned only to do certain things, they introduce thresholds or assessment criteria – essentially gate-keeping.  The thinking here is there's only a scarce resource available, so you need to ration what you do.  
  • But, when people get turned away (or referred, or sign-posted), it means they either present elsewhere in the system, or come back later when their needs are higher.  Thresholds can be a false economy, as when people get worse they are more expensive to support.  
  • Instead of building trust and relationships with their partners, commissioners and funders are typically interested in accountability (which is a nicer way of saying management by fear).  It means providers becomes concerned with external approval, which undermines intrinsic motivation and responsible practice.   
  • To hold providers to account, commissioners use monitoring and performance management.  They ask for detailed information about how workers are spending their time, what activities they're doing, or if they are working to the standard.  A damaging example is 'time and task' commissioning in homecare services.  
  • Another way to hold people to account is by setting numerical targets.  I've written about the problems with targets in a previous post.  They change the focus from doing the right thing to making the numbers look good, even if that means doing the wrong thing.  
  • The undesirable effects of targets can be made even worse by payment by results.  They are a way to financially reward providers for producing data about targets, and not for helping the people they exist to help.  

Imagine what the place I visited might look like if it were commissioned in the traditional way?  What would it be like for the women who go there?  What would it be like for the staff and volunteers?  Would it be any more efficient?

Why do we fund and commission in this way?


As business writer Aaron Dignan puts it, "The way we work is broken.  It was invented 100 years ago on a factory floor for a world that no longer exists".  Commissioning is a symptom of these outdated ways of working, grounded in mass-production and 'Taylorism', which results in treating people as though they are parts in a production line.

In the 1980s, public services started to embrace what was subsequently called New Public Management.  This meant running public services as though they were private sector organisations, being more 'business-like', treating citizens as customers, and attempting to use competitive markets to reduce costs.   This led to policies like Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), later replaced by Best Value, which are is still with us today.  

What are the alternatives?


There are many folks who know much more than me about how to improve funding and commissioning practices.

My go-to person for this is usually Toby Lowe.  He's an academic, who's previously been a provider of commissioned services, and has done loads of research in to this area with voluntary and public sector organisations. With his colleague Dawn Plimmer, he's put all of this into a brilliant report called Exploring the new world: Practical insights for funding, commissioning, and managing in complexity.  You can watch him speaking about it in this 13 minute video.

Andy Brogan, co-founder of Easier Inc, has recently written an accessible 'how' to report.  It gives lots of insight and helpful advice on how to put what he calls 'Commissioning 2.0' in to practice.

Jo Gibson from Vanguard has been doing some great work in this area too.  You can watch one of her students speaking about how they changed the way they commissioned homecare services in this 20 minute talk.  Jo is co-hosting a one-day commissioning event in London on 5 May 2020 which is worth checking out.

Over to you...


Do you work for a an organisation that provides commissioned or funded services?  How accurately  does what I've written here reflect your world?

Likewise, if you're at an organisation that commissions or funds services, are you still doing it in a traditional way, or have you started to look at some of the alternatives?

I'd love to read your thoughts in a comment below.  And please do feel free to share this with anyone who might be interested.  


26 September 2019

Review: Beyond Command and Control (in people-centred services)


"Paul's life fell off the rails.  Over a period of 10 months, he was subject to 179 activity records by public servants, involving 91 staff from 20 different teams.  He experienced 12 assessments and 11 referrals, leading to six hospital admissions with total stays of 81 days, while staff generated seven support plans.  At no time did anyone spend time with Paul to understand what mattered and what 'success' might mean to him."
This is from the people-centred services chapter of John Seddon's new book, Beyond Command and Control.  It sums up much of what I've found when looking at these types of services.

I'm already a fan of John's writing, and have read many of his other books.  It was one of John's books that first got me thinking differently about improving services.

I've kindly been sent an advanced copy of the book.  Rather than covering all of it, I'm going to attempt to review the chapter on 'people-centred services', as it's an area I've worked with in local government.

What are people-centred services?

This is a term John uses to describe services that respond when "people's lives fall off the rails in a variety of ways". For example, services such as social care, domestic abuse, and homelessness are some people-centred services I've worked with.

They differ to transactional services as they usually require a relationship with the person first, in order to understand them and their situation.  How an organisation responds to "can I book a squash court" should be different to its response to "I'm struggling with my debt and my health".

Sadly, as John describes in this chapter, we too often see a transactional response when a people-centred one is needed, causing all sorts of things to go wrong.

What's wrong with the current design of these services?

The chapter highlights many of the problems with the prevailing "command and control" approach to designing and managing people-centred services.  Here are some of them.

• Targets. I've written about the problems with targets before. They're often set by politicians, hide the truth, and lead to sub-optimisation: "the time taken to get 'on target' is actually a reflection of the time it took public-sector managers' ingenuity to work out how to at least appear to be on target by gaming the system". 

In the example of care assessments, meeting targets "simply covers up the terrible truth: the extraordinary time it takes people to get through the red tape, mind-boggling number of people involved, the forms, assessments, reminders..." 

• Functional specialisms.  If you approach a council for help you "may be seen by a dozen or more people" each "considering your needs through their own specialist lens". 

I've seen this myself.  People get assessed and referred all over the place – like in a game of pass the parcel.  Each professional is only allowed to do their 'bit'.  All the activity going on here costs so much money, without really helping anyone.

• Standardisation.  A one size fits all approach which means "services inevitably fail to match the variety of people's needs, providing some things that don't help and others that go further than necessary".  Care services are commissioned on a "time and task" basis, meaning you get "30 minutes regardless of whether 10 or 40 might be better".  

This two minute video powerfully highlights many of the problems with this approach.  




• Managing demand. Or as John puts it "rationing by another name: limiting services, finding excuses to turn people away".  This is done in the name of reducing cost.  But when people's needs don't meet the criteria, they are left for the condition to get worse, meaning they cost more to support later.  

This was backed up recently by some superb research by Dr Rick Hood and colleagues.  It found children "screened out" of social care services are more likely to re-enter the system later on, with more complicated (and therefore costly) problems.  This is an example of failure demand, an important term originally coined by John in previous books.  

*            *            *

The chapter also explains a number of other flaws with typical people-centred services, including budget management, cost-cutting, commissioning, and a belief in market forces.  

Is there a better way?

Yes.  John describes a more effective design.  It starts with understanding demand and doing only the work that's of value to the citizen.  This consists of understanding the citizen and their need in context, helping them establish what a good life would look like for them, discovering what they can do for themselves to live a good life, and lastly looking at what support they may need from elsewhere.  

By focusing on doing only this, and cutting out the forms, signposting, remote assessment, rationing, standardised assessments, etc: "Lives get put back on rails... costs of services provided fall dramatically... and... as individuals and families are straightened out... overall demand begins to fall away".  

There are examples of where this has been achieved from a number of places, including a county council, a Swedish municipality, and some encouraging work done in Wales between a commissioner and care provider.  

In summary

This is an important read for anyone who works with people-centred services, or is concerned about increasing costs and demand in the public sector.  

It gives a crystal clear account of the problems with the current command and control design, valuable insights in to why that design is flawed, and demonstrates an alternative that's better for citizens, better for people working with citizens, and one that greatly reduces costs and demand.  

For a perspective of other parts of the book – especially the chapter on Agile – I highly recommend reading this review from Bob Marshall.

You can find more about the book, including how to order it, here.

20 December 2018

How to speak with customer-facing colleagues


"Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil and you're a thousand miles from the corn field." 
– Dwight D Eisenhower


One of my favourite things to do in a service improvement role is spending time with customer-facing colleagues (by 'customer', I could also mean citizen, service user, client, patient, etc.)  I used to work in customer-facing roles myself, and miss being able to make an immediate difference.  I also find it incredibly useful for understanding how a service can be improved.

At the same time, I appreciate that some people don't enjoy the prospect of going to the coalface.

In this post, I'm going to give some reasons why you absolutely should spend time with customer-facing colleagues.  I'm also going to offer some advice and a few questions you could ask your colleagues.  These questions have worked really well for me, from a service improvement perspective.

I'm hoping that, by sharing this advice, some of you become a little less reluctant to go to the front-line, and feel encouraged to give it a go.  If you already spend time with customer-facing staff, reading on may help you get even more from the experience.

Why do it?


If you're not a customer-facing worker – for example, if you're a manager or work in a support role (IT, HR, Policy, somewhere in the 'corporate centre', etc) I'd say it's essential you spend regular time at the front-line.  I'd also recommend doing it if you are a customer-facing worker and want to learn more about another team.  Why?  Here are just a few reasons:
  • The legendary business writer Tom Peters has referred to a conversation he had with Howard Schultz,  former CEO of Starbucks*.  It's a huge organisation, yet despite the inevitable bureaucracy, hierarchy, meetings, and reports, Schultz says he visits at least 25 Starbucks stores a week.  He apparently said that "...we still sell one cup at a time, one customer at a time, one server at a time.  I need to see it, touch it, and feel it".  Peters calls this MBWA (Managing By Wandering Around).  If you're from a Lean background, you might call this the equivalent of doing a gemba walk or genchi genbutsu.
  • As the picture below says better than words could, your customer-facing colleagues are the ones who have the greatest knowledge of what matters to the customer, and what gets in the way of helping the customer.  They often have the best insights in to how you can improve service.  I always find colleagues respond well when I spend time with them and seek their views.  They especially love it when I bring a leader from the organisation along with me – they appreciate the leader taking them seriously, and the leader becomes more highly respected as a result.  If you're not getting these insights directly, you're missing big opportunities to improve your organisation and build important relationships with your colleagues.  

  • Human Factors expert Steven Shorrock writes in this superb blog post about the 'four varieties of human work'.  I've summarised and simplified these in the quadrants below.  Work as imagined is what you think people do.  Work as prescribed is what the policy or procedure says people should do.  Work a disclosed is what people say about their work.  None of these represent work as done, what Shorrock describes as "the most important yet most neglected variety of human work".  And you're not going to get anywhere near to work as done by reading reports, staff survey results, process maps, or fancy charts.  You need to spend some time 'in the work' with your customer-facing colleagues.  

Questions to ask customer-facing colleagues


The following questions have worked really well for me, from a service improvement perspective.  I initially borrowed and adapted some questions recommended by the folks at Vanguard.  When I ask these questions, people tend to really engage, and their answers give lots of information and clues about how and where the service could improve.

  • Where does your work come from, and how fit for purpose is it when it arrives?  This one is good to ask people who receive work from someone else.  Referrals, for example.  It gives you some clues about the quality of work they receive, and how much rework they have to do to get it right.
  • Can you show me what you do with the work when it arrives?  As a general principle, it's best to aim for 'show' rather than 'tell'.  This gets you closer to work as done, instead of work as disclosed (see above).
  • Why do you do it this way?  This may demonstrate the rules, policies, and procedures that staff are expected to follow.  Or they may reveal workarounds they have to do to get around constraints.
  • What gets in the way of you doing a good job?  If you're only going to ask one question, ask this one.  I find people really open up to this one, pointing out many areas where they are hindered in doing what matters to the customer.  Keep asking "what else?" to learn even more.  
  • What wastes your time?  Similar to the last one.  I often find I start to learn more about the type and frequency of failure demand in the answers to this one.
  • How much, and how often?  A supplementary question for any of the above.  This helps you to start to quantify the waste in the service.  For example, I once found that around 60% of referrals received by one team needed to be reworked.  
  • How do you know if you are doing a good job? You'll often find out here if people are clear about purpose, or (linked to the previous question) if the focus is instead on trying to make the numbers look good.
  • How does change happen around here?  This will tell you how people feel, in terms of being involved and engaged with change.   

I recommend trying to ask these questions naturally in conversation – rather than looking like you are coming around with a clipboard and a survey.  It may be worth committing a few of them to memory first.  

And most importantly, when you ask these questions, listen!  As my friend Jo Gibson says, "give people a damn good listening to".  Remember you're here to learn, not to judge or defend current ways of working.  As Dale Carnegie wrote, "become genuinely interested in other people".  And demonstrate what Amy Edmondson calls 'situational humility' – make sure people know that you don't think you have all the answers, be curious, and emphasise that we can always learn more.

Over to you...


What are your thoughts?  What other reasons are there to spend time with customer-facing colleagues?  What can put people off doing it?  And what do you think of the questions I suggested?

Please feel free to comment below, or share this on Twitter or LinkedIn, or with someone who might appreciate it.


*Yes, I know Starbucks don't pay enough tax and put too much sugar in their drinks.  That's not the point here.  The point is that the CEO of an undeniably successful and huge organisation found it essential to regularly spend time with customer-facing colleagues and literally 'smell the coffee'.  

31 August 2018

Do 40 points mean your football team is safe from relegation?

This post is about football (soccer) and variation of data over time.  I hope you're a fan of both!  If you're not, you're still likely to find at least some of what follows useful in the workplace.

In the English Premier League, it's a commonly held assumption that when a team reaches 40 points they will be safe from getting relegated to the next league down.

I recently read an article from the Guardian newspaper that challenged this belief.  It suggested around 36 points would mean safety.  If you're not familiar with this 'rule of thumb', I recommend reading the article before continuing.  You'll find it here.

Like at work, when people start throwing single numbers around, I started to wonder:  "how have they come up with that number?"  "have they understood the variation?" and "what would it tell us if we put it in a control chart?"  I did that, and here's what it looks like:

















As you can see, it's a type of line chart, and I've plotted it as a time series.  Each dot shows the points needed to escape relegation (one point more than the relegated team) each season.

Like just about any data, there is variation.  In some seasons more points would have been needed than in others.  The three coloured lines on the chart help us make sense of that variation.

Average line


The red line in the middle is the mean average.  Although it's useful, there are problems when people only report on the average.  In my experience, the average becomes the number.  This is how they came up with 36 points in the Guardian article.  But the average doesn't take in to account variation.

For example, what's the average of 1 and 19?  And what's the average of 9 and 11?  The answer to both is 10, but the average doesn't tell us how much variation there is.  9 and 11 are much closer together than 1 and 19, but the average alone hides this information.   The same point is nicely made with this picture.

An average of 36 points (or 37 in my calculation) tells us nothing about how many points are needed to avoid relegation.  Roughly half the time more than 36 points will be needed, and the other half fewer will be needed.

Upper limit and lower limit lines


These are sometimes called the UCL (upper control limit) and LCL (lower control limit).

Data points going up and down between these lines are 'common cause' variation – the normal changes in the points needed for safety between seasons.  You shouldn't pay too much attention to the differences between these points.  They represent the 'noise' in the data.  The 43 points needed in 2002-03 is just as likely as needing 31 points in 2009-10.

A mistake I often see people make is to pay attention to common cause variation, and act as if something out of the ordinary has happened when it hasn't.

These lines also help with prediction.  If you want to be confident your Premier League team avoids relegation this coming season, 44 points should be enough.  And as long as you've got 29 points you've still got a chance.  Anything less than that and you're most likely doing down to the next division.

You might have spotted a couple of data points – 1992-93 and 1994-5 – above these lines.  That's what's called 'special cause' or 'assignable cause' variation.  It's a signal that something is different.  How you react to this would be different to how you'd react to common cause variation.  With special causes you'd ask "what's different?" or "why the change?"

In this case, there was a change.  For the first four seasons on the chart, the league was made up of 22 teams.  After then, it goes down to 20.  From 1995-96 onwards, teams are playing fewer games and therefore accumulating fewer points.

To show the change, the chart should really look like this:

















Here are some handy 'rules' for spotting other signals in control charts.  This is where the average line becomes particularly useful.


Should football clubs set themselves a points target?


Probably not!  When you set a target, making the number becomes the focus, rather than doing the right thing – in this case, the right thing for the football club and its fans.  It can also encourage a behaviour where people ease off when the targets is met, or looks like being met.  

In the 2012-13 season, Barnet Football Club were relegated from their division.  Their then manager, Edgar Davids was quoted as saying: 

"It's even more disappointing because we have reached all the objectives that the chairman set and reached the 51 points target but we've still gone down."

They would have probably have fared better if they'd focused on winning as many games as possible, rather than achieving an arbitrary number.


How does this relate to work?


This is all well and good when looking at sports league tables, but this blog is supposed to be about work and improving services.  With that in mind, there are some lessons we can take away from this post.

1. Be suspicious when people quote a single number – often the average.  For example, I've seen the average time it takes to process benefit claims become the only figure used.  It was about 17 days.  Managers thought this was good performance.  Customers and stakeholders were given this figure, and they came to expect that's how long they'd be waiting for.   But a control chart revealed the predictable variation to be anywhere between 0 and over 100 days.  The average alone tells you almost nothing about performance.

2. Be careful not to confuse common cause with special cause variation.  I was once at a meeting where a department's figures were all 'red' because they were worse than the previous month.  The manager was asked to go away, investigate what had happened, and write a report to bring to next month's meeting.  This was a complete waste of time.  I put the data in to a control chart, and it was just normal common cause variation.  The senior managers had unwittingly reacted to is as though it was a special cause.  The next month they were back to 'green' – possibly because of regression toward the mean.

3. Comparing just two data points tells you almost nothing – certainly not about variation.  Although not covered in the above example, we see performance reports that compare this month to last month, now to this time last year, etc.  They might have arrows or colours applied, to indicate if performance if 'good' or 'bad' in relation to a target.  People are supposed to make judgements or decisions based on this information, with absolutely no context.  Displaying the same amount of information in a control chart would look like this:

















If you took this chart to a meeting, people would probably laugh at you or tell you to leave.  Yet it's seen as perfectly acceptable to present the same inadequate amount of information in a 'scorecard' or 'dashboard' report.

4.  If in doubt, plot the data in a control chart.  Or at the very least plot it over time.  This post has hopefully made it clear that data has no meaning without context, and that you need a way to separate signals (special causes) from noise (common cause variation).  That's why control charts were invented!

5. Don't use numerical targets.  They're arbitrary and make performance worse.  If you want to know why, have a read of my previous post on the subject.


Further reading

23 April 2018

9 things to avoid doing when studying demand


The people at Vanguard have written a lot about studying demand in services.  Why you should do it, how you should do it, etc.  They even invented the term 'failure demand' – so I'm not going to repeat what they say here.  For a short introduction to studying demand, I recommend this one minute read from Simon Pickthall.

Instead, I'm going to share a few things I've learned that are not helpful to do when you study demand.  I've either witnessed everything in the list below, or made the mistakes myself. 

1. Do all the studying yourself.  As mentioned in a previous post, the main purpose of studying a service isn't for analysis.  It's to help people unlearn and relearn.  The best way for them to do this is by studying the service from the customer's perspective.  And studying demand is a great place to start.   

I made this mistake more recently than I would have liked.  The demand analysis became just another slide in a PowerPoint presentation.   It lost all it's impact, and definitely didn't change anyone's thinking about the service.

2. Guess what the demands are.  Get a bunch of managers together in a room.  Do some 'brainstorming' and –  based on opinions –  identify the most common type of failure demand.  Put these in spreadsheet, with actions, due dates, etc, against each type of failure demand.

Or, decide the most common types of demand in advance.  Make them in to a tick sheet, and give it to the people who receive the demand to fill in.  

Studying a service is all about learning and discovery – it's not about trying to have all the answers.

3. Use existing data.  Run a report from your CRM, using categories already defined by the consultants who implemented the CRM.  This is similar to the previous point, where you shouldn't assume in advance you know what the customer is calling about.  The difference here is you've paid someone else to do the guessing for you. 

4. Be constrained by the existing rules.  I was once with a team listening to demand for council housing repairs.  One of the most frequent demands – particularly around midday each day – was "are you still coming to today's appointment?"  The appointment was for a tradesperson to arrive at their home and carry out a repair. 

The existing appointment slot was 8am to 1pm.  For this reason, most of the team initially felt this can't be a failure demand.  The resident was calling during their appointment slot, not afterwards, so surely we've done nothing wrong?
 
They were viewing this demand through the lens of the existing organisational system, and all it's constraints.  Yes, no person has done anything wrong.  But the system could be improved to stop this demand happening in the first place.  For example, you could shorten the appointment slot.  Or, as some councils have done, ask the resident when they want you do carry out the repair, and turn up then. 

5. Don't involve the people who receive demand.  When you're sitting with them listening to demand, don't explain why your there or what you're doing.  Don't show them what you're writing down. 

It's important to show your findings to the people who receive the demand.  It removes some of the mystery about what you and your team are up to.  It's also an ideal way to validate your findings – show it to them and ask them if this looks like a 'normal' day.  Listen to what they say about it. 

6. Fear failure demand.  Look for excuses to categorise everything as value demand, for fear it will look bad or demotivate staff if you find too much failure demand.  If this happens, it starts to give you some clues about the organisational culture.  

7. Ignore the type of service you are studying.  I've made the mistake a couple of times of studying demand in a people-centred service in exactly the same way I would in a transactional service.   I've learned from this mistake now, and it's something I plan to write about in a future post.  

8. Gather too much data.  I've had people on my team before who were concerned they needed to collect data on thousands upon thousands of demands.  Yes, you need to be somewhat scientific.  But not to the extent of randomised controlled trial or anything else that requires similarly high levels or rigor. 

When have you studied enough demand?  When the people you're working with have learned what they need to learn, and when the demand has become predictable.  This means you're no longer seeing types of demand you haven't seen before. 

9.  Do nothing else.  I've seen demand analysis be treated as a one-off exercise, done in isolation.   There may sometimes be value in doing this, but you're missing out on a fantastic opportunity to improve the service if you do nothing else.

It's important to next find out how the service responds to value demand, and does what matters for the customer.  You'll then want to learn why the service responds in the way it does.  

*                                                  *                                                  *

How about you?  Have you done or seen any of these mistakes?  Are there any others you've seen that aren't covered here?  Please feel free to comment below, or share this with someone who might be curious.  

28 March 2018

Why it's all about the thinking

For my first post, I'm going straight to what I think is the most important topic – management thinking. 

One of the biggest lessons I've learned is that if the thinking doesn't change, real and sustainable improvements won't happen. 

If you're familiar with John Seddon or his organisation Vanguard, you'll probably recognise this diagram, showing the relationship between thinking, the system, and performance:

thinking_system_performance
Performance means things like customer satisfaction, costs or revenue, and staff morale.  It comes from the organisational system – rules, structure, performance measures, policies, procedures, roles, IT, etc.  The system isn't there by accident or chance.  It's been designed by people (usually those in charge), based on their thinking – the assumptions and theories about the design and management of work, and about the people who do the work.

Conventional organisations are based on what you might call command and control thinking.  Typically you find top-down control, decision-making removed from the work, targets, functional silos, etc.  Although often well intentioned, it leads to poorer service, increased costs, and a disgruntled workforce. 

Most of my failed attempts at improvement are because I didn't change the thinking.  At best those efforts lead to minor and short lived process improvements.  I've typically made at least one of the following mistakes:

1. Putting too much focus on the analysis, rather than changing thinking.  In the past, my focus has been on gathering data and analysing data. For example, big sample sizes of demand and end-to-end measures, or detailed process maps showing.  Data is important – really important – but on its own it won't change the thinking.

2. Doing all the learning myself.  Or sometimes only doing the learning with  the front-line team, and not with the leader who has the authority to change anything.  This comes partly from the previous point – my desire to get all the analysis.  But if I do all the data gathering and analysis, nobody's thinking will change.  It's also because I've not always put enough focus at the beginning on what Peter Block calls contracting: "an explicit agreement of what the [in my case internal] consultant and client expect from each other and how they are going to work together".

3. Leaving the thinking bit until last.  I used to get all my analysis done, and then finally try to introduce the thinking behind it all at the end.  This didn't work well.  Now I take any opportunity to talk about thinking right from the start.  For example, early on when listening to demand we might discover an average call-handling time target.  Before, I would have saved talking about the thinking behind it until the analysis was done.  Now I'll pause, and start asking questions like "how does this target effect the customers?" "how do your colleagues feel about it?" "why did someone think setting this target was a good idea?" "what are the assumptions behind it – about how we should manage, and about people and their motivations?"

So now you know some of my mistakes.  You might be wondering a few things.  How do you change thinking?  What should you replace the old command and control thinking with?  And how will you know if the new way of thinking leads to better performance?  These are all subjects I'll attempt to cover in future posts.

For now, what do you think about thinking?  Please feel free to leave a comment below, or share this post with anyone who could be interested.